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
Audio Rec:

NUMPAGE 42**Title Extensions:****Abstract****Descriptive** TITLE SUPPLIED.**Notes:****Title** PHOTOGRAPHS AND MISSION REPORTS: TARGET ROAD JUNCTION TILLE SUR**Added** SEULLES, FRANCE**Entries****Author:****Subject:****Major Command:****Administrative Markings**

No Administrative Markings Listed

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Sp-446-Su-Op-S
7 Jun 1944


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Form No. 106-B Prepare separate sheet for each target bombed

UNIT: TARGET: IX BC WIND 9TH
 1 Box POST DE LA ROQUE DATE 7 June 1944
 ATTACKING UNIT 1 Box
 TILLY-SUB-SHULES
 FIRST PHASE INTERPRETATION: TARGET HIT

1. TARGET BRIEFED TILLY-SUB-SHULES PRIMARY
 SECONDARY
 CASUAL

M.P.I. Crossroads in center of town.

M.P. Same as M.P.I.

TARGET ATTACHED TILLY-SUB-SHULES MILES FROM THE PRIMARY
 DIRECTION FROM PRIMARY

COORDINATES (If non-descript FINEPOINT) ON 1:50,000 MAP NO.
 NO. AND TYPE OF A/C DISPATCHED 16 A-20's NO. OF A/C ATTACKING 17
 BOMBING BY 3's, 6's, 12's, 18's 12's IN FOLLOWING ORDER 1
 NO. AND TYPE OF BOMBS DROPPED 88 x 500 GP, FUSING 1/10 nose, 1/40 tail.
 FUSING

3. HEADING OF A/C WHERE BOMBS DROPPED 325 deg. M.

5. TIME BOMBS DROPPED 0904

6. ACTIVITY AT TARGET


RESULTS OF BOMBING:

BOX 1. EXCEL: Bombs fell in loose pattern, with main point of bursts falling 190 ft. from desired M.P.I. Hits are seen on several highways, possibly blocking same.


LT. MARZOLF

LT. BASNETT

Clayton W. Zeigler
 CLAYTON W. ZEIGLER,
 Captain, Air Corps,
 Photo Intelligence Officer.



16th Bomb Group 'L'



69

RESULTS OF BOMBING:


BOX 1. GROSS: Bomba fell near bridge at Pont De La Roque, 18.5 miles south of target. Several hits were scored on highway approach to bridge, probably damaging South end of bridge.


MAG WILLETTS

LT. ROYALTY

CLAYTON W. ZIEGLER,
Captain, Air Corps,
Photo Intelligence Officer.

Photo Intelligence Officer.





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WETHERS FIELD
416TH BOMB GROUP (W)


TAKEOFF - 0745
RETURN - 1015

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *Intd*

DATE 7 JUNE 1944
PERIOD 0700 - 1100
Hq SOS USAPP 9-43/90M/1522

OPERATIONAL ROUTE FORECAST

	A BASE TO TARGET	B TARGET	C TARGET TO BASE	D
1 WEATHER	SCATTERED SHOWERS	SCATTERED SHOWERS	SCATTERED SHOWERS	
2 CLOUDS	SCATTERED CIRRUS ABOVE 20,000 FT NIL MED CLOUD OVER BASE BECOMING 4-5/10 SOUTH OF ENGLAND AND CHANNEL BASE 14,000 FT 8-9/10 CUMULUS BASE 2,000 TO 2,500 FT S.W. OF LONDON CLOUD 5-7/10 BECOMING 4/1000 FT OVER CHANNEL AND CONTINENT AREA. TAPS 2,000 TO 8,000 FT	10/10 STRATOCUMULUS BASE 4,000 TO 5,000 FT TOPS 7,000 TO 8,000 FT	CLOUD BASE IN BASES 15,000-20,000 FT WITH SOME TOPS 9,000 TO 10,000 FT SCATTERED SHOWERS	
3 ICING	MODERATE TO HEAVY CLEAR ICE IN CLOUD ABOVE 5,000 FT	SAME	SAME	
4 VISIBILITY	4-6 MILES RUNNING 8-10 MILES OVER CHANNEL & CONTINENT	6 TO 8 MILES	4-6 MILES RUNNING 8-10 MILES OVER CHANNEL & CONTINENT	
HEIGHT	DIRECTION VELOCITY	DIRECTION VELOCITY	DIRECTION VELOCITY	DIRECTION VELOCITY
SURFACE	340 18			
5,000 FT	340 28			
10,000 FT	340 33			
12,000 FT	340 36			
15,000 FT	340 40			
FT				
FT				
BASE ALTIMETER SETTING <u>29.74</u>		TARGET SURFACE TEMP <u>+13°C</u>	TARGET MEAN TEMP <u>+6°C</u>	TARGET SURFACE (PRESSURE-ALT) <u>7177</u>
		TEMP. AT <u>5,000</u> FT. <u>5°C</u>		

AIRCRAFT REPORT				
		BASE TO COAST	OVER CHANNEL OR SEA	OVER CONTINENT & TARGET
TIME				
POSITION				
ALTITUDE				
CLOUD BELOW AIRCRAFT	AMOUNTS AND TYPE			
	HEIGHT OF BASE AND TOP			
CLOUD ABOVE AIRCRAFT	AMOUNTS AND TYPE			
	HEIGHT OF BASE AND TOP			
VISIBILITY				
TEMPERATURE				
WINDS				
REMARKS: AS WEATHER ENCOUNTERED, FRONTAL POSITIONS, ETC.				
NOTE: AT LEAST ONE COMPLETE OBSERVATION SHOULD BE ENTERED IN EACH COLUMN. THE OTHER SIDE OF THIS CARD HELPED YOU- WON'T YOU GIVE THE NEXT FELLOW A BREAK!		CLOUD TYPES AND ABBREVIATIONS		
		LOW CLOUDS = ST-STRATUS SC-STRATOCUMULUS MIDDLE CLOUDS = AS-ALTOSTRATUS AC-ALTOCUMULUS HIGH CLOUDS = CI-CIRUS CS-CIRROSTRATUS CU-CUMULUS CB-CUMULONIMBUS		
		FRONTS - 		

Int'l

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
 16TH BOMB GROUP (L)
 OFFICE OF THE WEATHER OFFICER

APG 140
 7 June 1944

SUBJECT: Interrogation Report

TO : Staff Weather Officer, Headquarters IX
 Bomber Command, APG 140, U.S. Army.

BASE AT TAKEOFF: Visibility 4 miles. Overcast with
 breaks of fractostratus at 1,000
 feet.

ROUTE OUT: Overcast with breaks at 1,500 to 2,000 feet
 over England raising to 5,000 feet over the
 channel, but lowering again over France to
 2,000 feet. Scattered showers all along the
 route. Visibility 6 to 8 miles except 3 to
 4 miles in showers.

TARGET BOX I : Overcast of stratocumulus at 2,100 feet
 with scattered patches of acid cloud at
 2,000 feet. Visibility 6 to 8 miles.

TARGET BOX II : Overcast of stratocumulus at 2,500 ft.
 Visibility 6 to 8 miles.

ROUTE BACK: Similar to route out.

BASE ON RETURN: 7/10 to 9/10 stratocumulus at 1,000 ft.
 Visibility 6 miles.

WINDS: As forecast.


TIME OVER TARGET: 0909

AFFECT OF WEATHER ON BOMBING: Scattered clouds at flight
 altitude on bomb run of Box I, made it difficult
 to locate target. Weather did not affect bombing
 of Box II.

Walter D. Castle
 WALTER D. CASTLE,
 1st Lt. Air Corps,
 Staff Weather Officer.

1 Incl.
 3 Route Forecast Forms.

CONFIDENTIAL



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FROM COBOMGR 416

TO COMBAT WING 97 ATT: COM O

A - YS - 65

B - 7 JUNE 1944

C - 38 A/C

D - 670 - K - DYNAMOTOR WAS CAUSING EXCESSIVE NOISE; PUT IN NEW UNIT.

670 - P - FIRST AUDIO TUBE IN RECEIVER BURNED OUT - PUT ENTIRE NEW SET IN SHOP.

669 - T - CHANNEL A INOPERATIVE; RETUNED AND CHECKED OK.

668 - T - - VHF OUT; RETUNED AND CHECKED OK.

668 - K -

671 - X - BROKEN SWIVEL JOINT CAUSED INOPERATIVE TURRET INTERPHONE.


E - LOCAL BUNCHER BEACON USED ALSO QDM'S FROM INSNAP D/F.

F - FORMATION LEADER REPORTED TO PARADE AFTER LEAVING TARGET AREA.

WACE COBOMGR 416


OFFICIAL:

JACK B. COONEY
CAPT., AIR CORPS.
COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER.




Box #	OpsFI	Date	F/O	Target	Alt.	Box Leader	T/O	15 min.			
I		7 June 44					TOT				
							L/D				
A/C	Fail to Bomb	ATT	Bomb Disp	A/C Dam.	F/A	Pers.					
No.	Reason	P	S	J	T	R	P	D	K	W	M
455	Mid	✓		3							
450	Mid	✓		4							
0157		✓		6							
846		✓		6							
202	Passout	✓			4						
961		✓		6							
925		✓		6							
943		✓		6							
224		✓		3							
717		✓		4							
165		✓		6							
147		✓		6							
209		✓		4							
303		✓		4							
214	x	✓		4							
219		✓		4							
467		✓		4							
914		✓		4							
202				4							
0211				4							
				10							
				82							

W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. 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W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M. M. L.	W. M.
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Box #	Ops Fl	Date	F/O	Target	Alt.	Box Leader	T/O	15 min.
						<i>H. Magoff</i>	TOT	
							L/D	
A/C	Fail to Bomb	ATT.	Bomb Disp.	A/C Dam.	E/A	Pers		
No.	Reason	P S O	P S J F R	M D A A C B E E	D P D K W M			
876		✓	6					
135		✓	6					
684		✓	4					
941	<i>undamaged</i>	✓	4					
0184		✓	6					
907		✓	6					
1211		✓	6					
0210		✓	6					
221		✓	4					
978		✓	6					
951		✓	4					
533		✓	4					
0176		✓	6					
493		✓	4					
227		✓	4					
217		✓	4					
086		✓	4					
837		✓	4					
195	<i>no F.O.</i>	✓	6					
			<i>6</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>16</i>		
			<i>6</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>16</i>		




P.R.C.

GENERAL INDEX

Lessay Bridge
 Target Ville Sur Seullles RJ Date 7/6/44 No. A/C 37 Mission 69 FO 352

Status Attacked Brief Officer Lt. Luria

1. IX BG Synopsis of Mission. -----
2. OpFlash Report. -----Filed.
3. Telephone Report.-----None Available.
4. Photos.-----Filed.
5. Field Orders, Annex's, Amendments. -----Filed.
6. Briefing Notes. -----None Available.
7. Loading List of Airplane Crews.-----Filed.
8. Chart of Route Flown - Flak.-----
9. Operations Oprep Report.----- Filed.
10. Bombing Information.-----Filed.
11. Mission Report-Aircraft.----- None required.
12. E/A Encountered. -----None
13. Weather Reports. -----Filed.
14. Communication "YS" Report. -----Filed.
15. Navigator's Log & Flight Plan. -----
16. Battle Casualties. -----None
17. Analysis of Gunnery. ----- - See Oprep Report, Par. E.
18. Ammunition Expenditure. -----See OpsFl Report, Par. I
19. Recapitulation Forms.-----Filed.



MISSION SUMMARY

Target: Lessay (Highway Bridge)
F/O : #352
Date : 7 June 44
Results: Box I - Gross


LESSAY (HIGHWAY BRIDGE)

416 BG: 19 a/c were dispatched, 17 dropping 82 x 500 Gp on a bridge mistaken for the primary target.

Two a/c failed to attack because of personnel errors.

No losses, casualties or battle damage. Bombing was by eighteens from 2000 feet.

Box I - GROSS. Bombs fell near a bridge at Pont de la Roque, 14 $\frac{1}{2}$ miles South of the target. Several hits were made on the highway approach, probably damaging the North end of the bridge. (Bombardier attacked the wrong target due to faulty navigation.)



MISSION SUMMARY

Target: Tilly-sur-Seulles (Rd. Junct.)
F/O : #352
Date : 7 June 44
Results: Box I - Fair


TILLY-sur-SEULLES (RD. JUNCT.)

416 BG: 18 a/c were dispatched, 17 dropping 86 x 500 GP on the primary target.

One a/c failed to attack due to personnel error.

No losses, casualties or battle damage. Bombing was by eighteens from 200 feet.

Box I - FAIR. The pattern fell in loosely grouped clusters around and an average of 730 feet from the desired M.P.I., hits possibly cutting several highways.



OICOG OILAI V YAA YAA 07/7 OP
 FROM 416TH BG 07/1300B
 TO : HQ IX Bomber Command ATTN: A-2
 HQ 97TH COMBAT WING ATTN: A-2
 CONFIDENTIAL DT
 U-29-D
 OPSFLASH NO. 64 FOR 7 JUNE 1944
 ZENKXXXXXXXX



- A. (I) LESSAY BRIDGE
 (II) LESSAY BRIDGE
- B. (I) 416TH BG
 (II) /222/ 19 A20'S
 (III) 2A/C PILOT USED WRONG SWITCHES ON 1 A/C. PILOT OF
 OTHER A/C THOUGHT HE WAS NOT IN POSITION WHEN LEADER DROPPED
 HIS BOMBS.
 (IV) 17 A/C ON PRIMARY.
- C. (I) 0740
 (II) 0004
 (III) 1038
- D. (I) NIL
 (II) NIL
 (III) E-G-0
- E. A GOOD PATTERN OF BOMBS DROPPED AROUND TARGET WITH FAIR TO
 GOOD RESULTS.
- F. (I) (A) NIL
 (B) NIL
 (II) (A) NIL
 (B) NIL
- G. 30 LOADED CARS ON TRACKS AT ST. JORES WITH LIGHT FLAK GUNS AROUND
 THEM. NEW TEMPORARY BRIDGE OVER LETAUTE RIVER AT ST. GEORGES
- H. (I) LOW CLOUDS WITH BASE AT 2000 FEET VISIBILITY 2/2/1/1/1
 6-8 MILES BELOW OVERCAST.
 (II) SAME AS TXX OT TARGET EXCEPT FREQUENT LOW CLOUDS WITH BASE
 AT 1500 FEET.
- I. 82 X 500 G P BOMBS ON PRIMARY
 10 X 500 G P BOMBS RETURNED .
- J. 2000 FEET.

DT 07/1300B
 AS CC / "C" ZENKXXXXXXXX PART (II) SHOULD READ
 (II) 0004
 WJF AR
 OICOG R.....07/1400B DEF 0

WHAT IS THE CT AFTER THE 3

IMI PLS


WHAT IS THE "CT" IN THE HEADING AFTER THE 1944 FOR?

I DONT HAVE THAT FOR 67 140 00 075

IMI PLS

OILAI R.....07/1415B RL AR K

0



OICOG OILAI V YAA 7/7 OP
 FROM 416TH BG 07/1300B
 TO : HQ IX Bomber Command
 HQ 97TH COMBAT WING
 CONFIDENTIAL BT
 U-88-D


ATTN: A-2
 ATTN: A-2




OPSFLASH NO . 65 FOR 7 MAY 1944

A. (I) TILLY SUR SEULLES R/J
 (II) TILLY SURSEULLES R/J
 B. (I) 416TH BG
 (II) 18A-20'S
 (III) 1A/C PILOT THOUGHT A/C WAS NOT IN POSITION TO DROP
 WHEN LEADER DROPPED.
 (IV) 17A/C ON PRIMARY
 C. (I) 0746
 (II) 0909
 (III) 1024
 D. (I) NIL
 (II) NIL
 (III) 0-0-0
 E. GOOD PATTERN OF BOMBS COVERING THE TARGET AREA.
 F. (I) (A) NIL
 (B) NIL
 (II) (A) NIL
 (B) NIL
 G. 10 TANKS 10 MILES SW OF CHEN. HALTED WHEN FORMATION APPROACHED.
 50 GLIDERS IN OPEN FIELD NEAR DOUVRES-PLUNETOT
 H. (I) LOW CLOUDS WITH BASE AT 2000 FEET VISIBILITY 6-8 MILES
 (II) SAME AS AT TARGET EXCEPT FREQUENT LOW CLOUDS WITH BASE AT
 1500 FEET.
 I. 06 X 300 G. P. ON PHOENIX PRIMARY
 6 X 500 G. P. RETURNED .
 J. 2000 FEET.
 BT 07/1300B
 AS
 WJF BBBB
 OICOG R.....''33071330B CJD KKKK


OILAI R.....''07/1330B SS KKKK











C. S-2 Form No. 10

PHOTOGRAPHIC REPORT


CAMERAS INSTALLED	<u>8</u>	<u> </u>	%	GROUP	<u>413TH</u>
CAMERAS PHOTOGRAPHING	<u>8</u>	<u>100%</u>	%	WING	<u>97TH CBW</u>
CAMERA FAILURES	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	%	DATE	<u>7 June 1944</u>
PERSONNEL FAILURES	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	%		
OTHERS	<u>0</u>				

	<u>914</u>			TARGET	<u>Lessay</u>
	<u>363</u>			ALT.	<u>2,000</u> ft
<u>717</u>		<u>750</u>		TRUE AIR SPEED	<u>220</u> mph
				GROUND SPEED	<u>201</u> mph

	<u>711</u>			TARGET	<u>Tilly-Sur-Seulles</u>
	<u>221</u>			ALT.	<u>2,000</u> ft
<u>217</u>		<u>907</u>		TRUE AIR SPEED	<u>220</u> mph
				GROUND SPEED	<u>208</u> mph

				TARGET	
				ALT.	
				TRUE AIR SPEED	
				GROUND SPEED	

BOX NO.	A/C NO.	CAM. TYPE	F.L.	INT.	PRINTED SORTIES	UNPRINT. SORTIES	EXPLANATION
1	914	K-20	6 3/8			79	
1	363	K-24	5	2		180	
1	717	K-24	5	2	179		
1	750	K-24	5	2	181		
2	711	K-20	6 3/8		80		
2	221	K-24	5	2	178		
2	217	F-24	5	2		182	
2	907	K-24	5	2	177		



B.C.S-2 Form No. 106- Prepare separate sheet for each target bombed

HER UNITS: TARGET : IX BC WING 97TH
 1 Box FORT DE LA MOQUE DATE 7 June 1944
 ATTACKING UNIT 1 Box
 416TH GROUP
 TILLY-SUR-SEUILLES
 FIRST PHASE INTERPRETATION : TARGET HIT

TARGET BRIEFED TILLY-SUR-SEUILLES PRIMARY
 SECONDARY
 CASUAL

M.P.I. Crossroads in center of town.

A.P. Same as M.P.I.

TARGET ATTACKED TILLY-SUR-SEUILLES MILES FROM THE PRIMARY
 DIRECTION FROM PRIMARY

COORDINATES (If non-descript PINPOINT) ON 1:50,000 MAP NO.

NO. AND TYPE OF A/C DISPATCHED 18 A-20's NO. OF A/C ATTACKING 17

BOMBING BY 3's, 6's, 12's, 18's 18's IN FOLLOWING ORDER 1

NO. AND TYPE OF BOMBS DROPPED 86 x 500 GP. FUSING 1/10 nose, 1/40 tail.
 FUSING

HEADING OF A/C WHERE BOMBS DROPPED 325 deg. N.


TIME BOMBS DROPPED 0906

ACTIVITY AT TARGET

RESULTS OF BOMBING:

BOX 1- EXCEL: Bombs fell in loose pattern, with mean point of bursts falling
 190 ft. from desired M.P.I. Site are seen on several highways,
 possibly blocking same.

CLAYTON H. ZESIGER,
 Captain, Air Corps,
 Photo Intelligence Officer.



1. P.C.S.-2 Form No. 106-B Prepare separate sheet for each target bombed

OTHER UNITS: TARGET : IX BC WING 97TH
 DATE 7 Nov 1954
 ATTACKING UNIT 1.50
 FIRST PHASE INTERPRETATION : TARGET HIT

TARGET BRIEFED : PRIMARY
 SECONDARY
 CASUAL

M.P.I. Highway bridge.

A.P. Same as M.P.I.

TARGET ATTACKED : MILES FROM THE PRIMARY 14.8
 DIRECTION FROM PRIMARY South

COORDINATES (If non-descript PINPOINT) 190530 ON 1:50,000 MAP NO. 87/3

NO. AND TYPE OF A/C DISPATCHED 18 A-20's NO. OF A/C ATTACKING 17

BOMBING BY 3's, 6's, 12's, 18's 18's IN FOLLOWING ORDER 1

NO. AND TYPE OF BOMBS DROPPED 82 x 500 87. FUSING 1/10 nose, 1/40 tail.

FUSING

1. HEADING OF A/C WHERE BOMBS DROPPED 00 deg. N.


2. TIME BOMBS DROPPED 0804

3. ACTIVITY AT TARGET

RESULTS OF BOMBING:

BOX 1- 48000: Bombs fell near bridge at Pont De La Roque, 14.8 miles south of target. Several hits were scored on highway approach to bridge, probably damaging south end of bridge.

CLAYTON W. FISHER,
 Captain, Air Corps,
 Photo Intelligence Officer.



OILAT OIYAA OIHAK OIEDN OIGAG OIPPF V OICOG 03/07 -OP-

FROM NINTH BOMBER COMMAND 07/0257B 9BC U-3636-E
TO: COCBTWIG 97, 98, 99
CO 1ST PATHFINDER SQ. (PROV)
COMBOMGR. 416, 409.
SECRET. QQ.

ANNEX NO. 1 TO F.O. 352

OPERATIONAL FCST TO GRPS CONCERNED PERIOD 0700-1100 HRS.. 7/8/44

BASE TO TARGET...SCTD CIRRUS ABV 20,000 FT.
NIL MED CLD OVER BASES BEING 4-5/10 WOUTH ENGLAND AND ACROSS
CHANNEL BASE 14,000 FT.
6-9/10 CU BASE 1000-1500 FT TOPS TO 8,000 FT WITH OCNL SHWR IN
BASES WITH CLD BASE 2000-2500 FT SOUTHWEST OF LONDON AND CLD 5-7/10
BEING 4,000 FT OVER CHANNEL AND ADJACENT CONTINENT AREA. TOPS 7000
TO 8000 FT.

VSBY 4-6 MILES RUNNING 8-10 MILES OVR CHANNEL AND CONTINENT.

TARGET: CHERBOURGH...SCTD CIRRUS ABV 20,000 FT.
4/10 MED CLD AT 14,000 FT.
5-7/10 CU BASE 3-4000 FT TOPS 7-8000 FT. SOME GOOD BRKS.
VSBY 10 MILES.

TARGET TO BASE. CLD BASE IN BASES 1500-2000 FT WITH SOME TOPS 9-10,000
FEET AND STILL OCNL SHWR. VSBY 8 MILES EXCEPT SOME SLIGHT RESTRICTION
IN SHWRS.

HAZARDS TO FLYING..ICING IN CLD ABV 5,000 FT.

FREEZING LEVEL..5000 FT.
ICING..IN BASE AREA MOD TO HVY CLR ICE IN SHWR CLD ABV 5,000 FT
BUT MOD ONLY ON RTN. SW ENG AND CHANNEL LGT TO MOD CLR ICE
WITH TENDENCY TOWARDS RIME CDNTS AFTER 1000 HRS WITH WND SLACKENING.

WINDS	DIR AND VEL	TEMPS
SFC	340-18	0
5,000	340-28	-7
10,000	340-33	-9
12,000	340-36	-13
15,000	340-40	
TEMP AT TARGET PLUS 13	MEAN TEMP TO 12,000 0 TO 8,000 PLUS 1.5	
	TO 5,000 PLUS 6	

PRESS ALT...

4902W/78 PLUS 159 29.75

4902W/78/D PLUS 159 29.75


4902W/33/R PLUS 177 29.73

COMMENTS...A TROUGH LINE IS EXPECTED CHERBOURGH AREA AT 0600 HRS AND TO
BE 120 MILES SOUTH OF IT AT 0900 HRS. CUMULUS CONVECTIVE CLDS BEHIND
THIS TROUGH. DURING DAY STABILIZING AFFECT WILL GIVE NORMAL CU
INLAND BASES AND CONTINENT. OUTLOOK FOR THIS EVENING FAIRLY PROMISING
ESPECIALLY ADJACENT CONTINENT WEST OF 0 MER.
END....

COMBOMCON NINE

BT07/0257B
WB LAR

OIYAA
OICOG R.....07/0355 B JF AR
OIHAK
OICOG R.....07/0355B MC AR



OINAK OICOF OIYAA OICOG V OILAI 1/27 OP
 FROM 97TH COMBAT BOMB WING 07/0610B U-2-E
 TO COMBOMCOM IX
 COBOMGP 409
 COBOMGP 410
 COBOMGP 416

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY BT
 SECRET SENT IN CLEAR AUTH. MAJOR CLARENCE S. TOWLES JR.

97TH COMBAT BOMB WING
 A P O 140
 7 JUNE 1944

FIELD ORDER NO. 66-352

MAPS: NORMAL

1. B. (2) ALLIED FIREFIGHTERS WILL FURNISH AREA COVER FOR ALL FORMATIONS OF THIS WING

2. THIS WING WILL ATTACK TARGETS IN FRANCE

ZERO HOUR: 070900B

3. A. 409TH BOMB GROUP


- (1) 4902 W/O/11
- (2) 3 BOXES OF 14 A/C
- (4) BASE TO SELSEY BILL TO 49 DEG. 24 MIN. NORTH 01 DEG. 08 MIN. WEST TO TARGET
- (5) TARGET TURN RIGHT TO 49 DEG. 42 MIN. NORTH 01 DEG. 16 MIN. WEST TO BRIGHTON TO BASE
- (7) 49 DEG. 24 MIN. NORTH 01 DEG. 08 MIN. WEST
- (8) GENERALLY SE TO NW
- (9) ILL. 4902 W/143 REF. 030057
- (10) 4 X 500 LB. G. P. FUSED 1/10 SEC NOSE 1/40 SEC TAIL
- (11) 4942 N 0116 W
- (12) T. O. T. 0900

B. 410TH BOMB GROUP

- (1) (A) 4902 W/B/36
(B) 4901 W/38
- (2) (A) 1 BOX 18 A/C
(B) 1 BOX 18 A/C
- (4) (A) BASE TO SELSEY BILL TO 4924 N 0055 W TO I. P. TO TARGET
(B) BASE TO BEACHY HEAD TO 4917 W 0014 W TO I. P. TO TARGET
- (5) (A) TARGET TURN RIGHT TO R. P. TO BRIGHTON TO BASE
(B) TARGET TURN RIGHT TO R. P. TO BEACHY HEAD TO BASE
- (7) (A) 4903 N 0127 W
(B) 4856 N 0030 W
- (8) (A) GENERALLY S TO N
(B) GENERALLY SE TO NW
- (9) (A) ILL. 4902 W/72/C REF. 019069
(B) ILL. 4901 W/38 REF. 053130
- (10) 4 X 500 LB. G. P. FUSED 1/10 SEC. NOSE 1/40 SEC. TAIL (A & B)
- (11) (A) 4924 N 0055 W
(B) 4920 N 0028 W
- (12) T. O. T. (A) 0905
(B) 0905

C 416TH BOMB GROUP

- (1) (A) 4902W/D/16
(B) G.S.G.S. 4250/7E/1
- (2) (A) 1 BOX OF 18 A/C
(B) 1 BOX OF 18 A/C
- (4) (A) BASE TO SELSEY BILL TO 49 DEG 24 MIN NORTH 00 DEG. 55. MIN WEST TO I.P. TO TARGET
(B) BASE TO BEACHYHEAD TO 4917 NORTH 0014 WEST TO I.P. TO TARGET.
- (5) (A) TARGET TURN RIGHT TO R.P. TO BRIGHTON TO BASE
(B) TARGET TURN RIGHT TO R.P. TO BEACHYHEAD TO BASE.
- (7) (A) 4903 NORTH 0127 WEST
(B) 4902 NORTH 0022 WEST
- (8) (A) GENERALLY SOUTH TO NORTH
(B) GENERALLY SOUTH EAST TO NORTH WEST
- (9) (A) ILL 4902W/72/E REF 013073
(B) REF. 840683 CROSS ROAD
- (10) (A) 4X500 LB GP FUSED 1/10 SEC NOSE 1/100 SEC TAIL.
(B) 4X500 LB GP FUSED 1/10 SEC NOSE 1/40 SEC TAIL.
- (11) (A) 4924 NORTH 0055 WEST
(B) 4920 NORTH 0028 WEST
- (12) (A) T.O.T. 0855
(B) T.O.T. 0855



- X. (1) TO (4) NO CHANGE
 (5) SHIPS WITH WING BACKS WILL CARRY 6X500 LB BOMBS.
 (6) ANY ROAD JUNCTION, RAILROAD JUNCTION OR BRIDGE MAY BE USED AS SECONDARY TARGETS IF FORMATION LEADER IS CERTAIN THAT THEY ARE ON ENEMY SIDE OF BOMB LINE.
 (7) ALL FORMATIONS WILL BOMB AT NORMAL ALTITUDES IF CLOUD CONDITIONS PERMIT. IF NOT BOMB BELOW CLOUD BASE DOWN TO BUT NOT BELOW 2000 FT.
 (8) THE 416TH BOMB GROUP WILL TAKE OFF AT LEAST 10 MIN BEFORE THE 410TH BOMB GROUP.

4. NO CHANGE

5. COMMUNICATIONS

- A. 409TH BOMB GROUP
 (2) ENGAGEMENT
 (5) GIMLET

- B. 410TH BOMB GROUP
 (2) ENCOT (BOX A)
 LADYMAN (BOX B)
 (5) GIMLET

- C. 416TH BOMB GROUP
 (2) FEETACHE (BOX A)
 DASHDOWN (BOX B)
 (5) GIMLET (BOX A)
 BOATMAN (BOX B)

X. GENERAL INFORMATION

- (2) FRISTON D/D
 WARMWELL D/D
 BRIGHTON AREA C/C
 (3) 13A, 10B, 6C, 7D, 8E, 9F, 5G, 11H,
 (8) SOUTH UTAH, SOUTHERN ARIZONA, SOUTHERN BRITISH FEDERATION
 (10) BVAT/BVAT
 (11) BOX LEADERS WILL REPORT TO COMMAND CONTROL ON CHANNEL C WHEN LEAVING TARGET AREA. GROUP LEADER WILL REPORT TARGET WEATHER TO COMMAND CONTROL.

COCBTWIG 97

BT0610B

CES/LCB AR

COF R.....07/0710B AK AR

YAA R.....07/0710B WFG AR


HAK R.....

28)) WILL YOU IMI (11) IN LAST PARA PLSE WE OVERPRINTED
 TIC LS

- (11) BOX LEADERS WILL REPORT TO COMMAND CONTROL ON CHANNEL C WHEN LEAVING TARGET AREA. GROUP LEADER WILL REPORT TARGET WEATHER TO COMMAND CONTROL.

HAK R.....07/0710B IDR AR

COG R.....



MISSION NO. 69

LOADING LIST

7 JUNE 1944

BOX I

FLIGHT I

1. 914 X
Major D.L. Willette
Lt. F.G. Royalty
T/S F.H. Larronde
S/S H.A. Lempka
2. 455 F
Capt. C.R. Jackson
Lt. A.H. Maltby
S/S R.K. Riley
S/S A.J. Bonomo
3. 925 G
Lt. E.T. Flatter
S/S K.L. Johnson
S/S J.L. Czech

4. 214 C
Lt. R.V. Wheeler
S/S J.S. Brower
S/S E. Corrin
5. 363 L
Lt. T.J. Murray
Sgt R.J. Jones
Sgt E.H. Debowser
6. 219 D
Lt. A.E. Harman
Sgt J.O. Young
Sgt A.D. Garrett

FLIGHT II

1. 467 W
Capt. G.M. McNulty
Lt. F.H. Bursiel
S/S H.E. White
S/S R.F. Addleman
2. 0211 O
Lt. W.J. Greene
S/S J.A. Ochaba
Pfc. B.K. Allen
3. 0167 F
Lt. D.F. Shea
S/S R.E. Lee
S/S F.C. Falk

4. 750 H
Lt. W.B. Ostrander
S/S J.E. Wilson
S/S I. Binney
5. 224 E
Lt. M.G. Brown
Sgt D.E. Burns
Sgt W.J. Daniel
6. 209 K
Capt. E.R. Moore
S/S O.D. Evans
S/S T.A. Palmer

FLIGHT III

1. 202 B
Lt. F.F.E. MacManus
S/S J.L. Rogers
S/S G.I. Fliessman
2. 943 F
Lt. E.J. Renth
S/S O.D. LaNave
S/S F.H. Citty
3. 961 E-1
Lt. M.S. Street
S/S C.A. Prindle
S/S E.T. Epps

4. 840 V
Lt. T. Boukamp
S/S R.J. Colosimo
S/S N. Radlich
5. 147 K-1
Lt. W.F. Tripp
Sgt J.O. Scott
S/S D.F. Mallory
6. 717 N
Lt. E.R. Hayter
Sgt F.E. Melchoir
S/S R.C. Halloway

SPARE

- 165 H
Lt. M. Zubon
T/S J.R.L. Tanner
S/S W.G. Russell

MISSION NO. 69
7 JUNE 1944
BOX I

MISSION NO. 69

LOADING LIST
BOX 11
FLIGHT I

1. 1711 S
LT L A MARZOLF
LT R J BASNETT
S/S H E WELLIN
S/S L G KUTZER

4. ~~XXX~~ 393 K
LT R E GREENLEY
S/S C J HARP
S/S K P BROWN

2. 135 T
CAPT M J HUFF
LT J KUPITS
SGT J W SABADOSH
SGT C E YOUNG

~~XXX~~
5. 937 B
LT A R DURANTE
S/S H T BEST
S/S I R DE GIUSTI

3. 951 P
MAJOR J G NAPIER
S/S W H COE
S/S E E KELLY

6. 221 F
LT J H MILLER
SGT R G SCHROM
SGT J GALENDER

FLIGHT II

1. 0210 Q
CAPT H F CONANT
S/S J A FEJES
S/S E R JUDD

4. 907 O
LT G EBENSTEIN
S/S H PERKINS
SGT S P NEWELL

2. 0176 T-1
LT W E DOWNING
S/S E S DICKENSON
S/S K E HORNBECK

5. 9194 C
LT S B RITCHIE
S/S E A ANDERSON
S/S J R ORR

3. 684 K-1
LT E B KREH
SGT E SHELTON
S/S D R SCHENCK

6. 0194 A
LT R G MEREDITH
S/S A A HILL
S/S R W MAC DONALD

FLIGHT III

1. 978 S-1
LT J F MEAGHER
SGT D HANTSKE
S/S E A DAMICO

4. 894 R-1
LT R D POINDEXTER
T/S L G ~~XXXX~~ ROBBINS
S/S D H ~~XXXXXX~~ SIMPSON

2. 207 B-1
LT R V MIRACLE
S/S J C BURKHALTER
S/S B C SIEG

5. 195 D-1
LT R R SVENSON
SGT P G FILD
S/S G E PFENNING

3. 227 F-1
LT L E HILL
S/S R W BURCH
S/S C H YOST

6. 217 D-2
LT R K CRUZE
S/S F L ADAIR
S/S C F LOVE

SPARE

493 V
LT R H SMITH
S/S A A STOCKHAM
SGT R J MAHONEY

MISSION NO. 69
BOX 11
7 JUNE 44

HEADQUARTERS
416TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (L)
Office of the Commanding Officer

SECRET
By authority
CG, Sta. 170
8 June 1944
Init. _____

APO 140, U. S. Army,
8 June 1944.

SUBJECT: Oprep A, USAAF Form 345.

TO : Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, APO 696, U. S. Army. Attention
26th Statistical Control Unit.

Oprep A Number 68 for 24 hours ending sunset 7 June 1944.

Mission Number 69.

IX Bomber Command Field Order Number 352.

A. Box 1. Formation consisted of 19 ships. Target - Lissey Bridge. Time of take-off was 0740. Time over target 0904. Lead Bombardier mistook Pontdelo Roque for primary and at 2000 feet attacked this target dropping a total of 35 bombs in this area. Visibility was 6 to 8 miles with scattered patches of seed clouds at 2000 feet. No anti-aircraft fire experienced. No enemy aircraft encountered. Planes landed at 1038.

Box 2. Formation consisted of 19 ships. Target - Tilly Sur Seulle R/C. Time of take-off was 0746. Time over target 0909. At 2000 feet a total of 90 bombs were dropped in the target area with fair results. Visibility was 6 to 8 miles with an overcast of stratocumulus at 2100 feet. No anti-aircraft fire experienced. No enemy aircraft encountered. Planes landed at 1024.

- B. (i) 16 A-200's and 3 A-20J's (box 1)
17 A-200's and 2 A-20J's (box 2)
(ii) 15 A-200's and 2 A-20J's (box 1)
16 A-200's and 2 A-20J's (box 2)
(iii) 1 A-20J (box 1) bombs failed to release - no attempt made to release - pilot thought ship was not in position for release.
1 A-200 (box 1) bombs failed to release - switches in wrong position.
1 A-200 (box 2) bombs failed to release - no attempt made - pilot thought that bombs would be in gross error.
(iv) None
(v) None
(vi) None
(vii) None
(viii) 16 A-200's and 3 A-20J's (box 1)
17 A-200's and 2 A-20J's (box 2)
- C. (i) None
(ii) None
- D. (i) A-200's 08:20
A-20J's 18:40
(ii) None

Oprep A, -orm 34A.

(Cont'd.)

2. (i) A-200's 50,400 x 50 cal. (box 1)
 A-20J's 6,300 x 50 cal. (box 1)
 A-20G's 53,550 x 50 cal. (box 2)
 A-20J's 4,200 x 50 cal. (box 2)
 (ii) A-20G's 384 x 50 cal. (testing) (box 1)
 A-20J's 75 x 50 cal. (testing) (box 1)
 A-20G's 396 x 50 cal. (testing) (box 2)
 A-20J's 55 x 50 cal. (testing) (box 2)
 (iii) None
3. (i) A-20G's 80 x 500 lb GP 1/10 N 1/100 T (Box 1) 3 G's bomb load 6x500 lb GP.
 A-20J's 16 x 500 lb GP 1/10 N 1/100 T (Box 1) 2 J's bomb load 6x500 lb GP.
 A-20G's 84 x 500 lb GP 1/10 N 1/40 T (Box 2) 3 G's bomb load 6 x 500 lb GP.
 A-20J's 12 x 500 lb GP 1/10 N 1/40 T (Box 2) 2 J's bomb load 6x500 lb GP.
 (ii) A-20G's 75 x 500 lb GP (box 1)
 A-20J's 10 x 500 lb GP (box 1)
 A-20G's 78 x 500 lb GP (box 2)
 A-20J's 12 x 500 lb GP (box 2)
 (iii) None
 (iv) None
 A-20J (box 1) 6 x 500 lb GP's returned to base - pilot thought ship was not in position to drop.
 A-20G (box 1) 4 x 500 lb GP's returned to base - switches in wrong position.
 A-20G (box 1) 1 x 500 lb GP returned to base - Arming wire loop caught in arming wire retainer causing an open circuit to release solenoid.
 A-20G (box 2) 2 x 500 lb GP's returned to base - Pilot failed to toggle off all bombs.
 A-20G (box 2) 4 x 500 lb GP's returned to base - no attempt made - pilot thought that bombs if released would be in gross error.
4. None
5. (i) None
 (ii) None
 (iii) None

For the Commanding Officer:

 GEORGE SCHWARTZ,
 Captain, Air Corps,
 Adjutant.

~~SECRET~~

BOMBING INFORMATION

IX B.C. FIELD ORDER NO. 352

ANNEX "A"

BOX I

416

DATE 7 June 44

Pontdelia Roque

GROUP

TARGET ATTACHED

Llanos de la

Pre-set. D-8 bombight used.

1. Method of Sighting:

2. Bombing approach:

000° Mag.

3. Was mercury erection system used? YES NO X4. Did entire box drop on lead bombardier? YES NO X

In either case explain fully method of sighting and dropping bombs; and specify exact aiming point actually used:

Lt. Royalty

5. Name of lead bombardier: Major Willett6. Name of lead pilot: None7. Intervalometer setting: 220 201 20008. Indicated Air Speed: 20 Ground Speed: 500 Altitude: 1/10 1/1009. Length of bomb run: 85 1 sec: 500 1/10 1/10010. Bomb Load and Fusing per A/C: X 1b FUSED N T11. Total Bombs Dropped:

12. Full statement of all factors affecting bombing - including: -

(a) Did weather conditions or visibility adversely affect identification of target attacked or bombing. YES NO. If "YES" state conditions and effect.(b) Apart from weather or visibility, was any difficulty encountered in identifying target attacked, IF or AF? YES NO. If answer is "YES", state circumstances and effect on bombing:(c) Did Flak affect bombing? YES NO. If answer is "YES", state to what extent Flak affected bombing or bomb run: No enemy a/c.(d) To what extent did attacks by enemy aircraft affect bombing? None

(e) State any difficulties on bombing run:

(f) Faulty navigation. Malfunctions, personnel errors or other factors affecting bombing:

(g) Bombing results as reported by crews:

Aimed at right Target: YES NO XResults claimed: GOOD FAIR POOR BAD MISS

*10 a/c bomb load 6 x 500 lb GP

(over)

~~SECRET~~

1. 6 to 8 miles.
2. Scattered patches of sea clouds at 1000 feet.
3. 1 box 19 ships.
4. Moderate from I.R.
5. Straight ahead, wooded areas.
6. Attacked wrong target.
7. Bad mine.
8. None.

4. Description of route from I.R. to target:

Formation consisted of 19 ships. Target - Lenny Bridge. Time of take-off was 0740. Time over target 0800. Lead bombardier mistook a patch of sea clouds for primary and at 2000 feet attacked this target dropping a total of 50 bombs in this area. Visibility was 6 to 8 miles with scattered patches of sea clouds at 2000 feet. No anti-aircraft fire experienced. No enemy aircraft encountered. Planes landed at 1030.

SECRET

BOMBING INFORMATION

IX B.C. FIELD ORDER NO. 352

ANNEX "A"

BOX 2 GROUP 416 DATE 7 June 44 TARGET ATTACHED Tilly Sur Seulle1. Method of Sighting: Pre-set. D-3 bombight used.2. Bombing approach: 325° Mag.3. Was mercury erection system used? YES NO X4. Did entire box drop on lead bombardier? YES X NO

In either case explain fully method of sighting and dropping of bombs; and specify exact aiming point actually used: Pre-set data used entirely.
API used as AP. Two passes made at target to be certain of identify.

5. Name of lead bombardier: Lt. Bassett6. Name of lead pilot: Lt. Harzolf.7. Intervalometer setting: 220 None 200 20008. Indicated Air Speed: 5 Ground Speed: 200 Altitude: 20009. Length of bomb run: 4 Sec: 1/10 1/1010. Bomb Load and Fusing per A/C: 30 X 500 lb FUSED N T11. Total Bombs Dropped: 30

12. Full statement of all factors affecting bombing - including: -

(a) Did weather conditions or visibility adversely affect identification of target attached or bombing. YES NO. If "YES" state conditions and effect.(b) Apart from weather or visibility, was any difficulty encountered in identifying target attached, IP or AP? YES NO. If answer is "YES", state circumstances and effect on bombing:(c) Did Flak affect bombing? YES NO. If answer is "YES", state to what extent Flak affected bombing or bomb run: X(d) To what extent did attacks by enemy aircraft affect bombing? No enemy a/c.(e) State any difficulties on bombing run: None(f) Malfunctions, personnel errors or other factors affecting bombing: None.

(g) Bombing results as reported by crews:

Aimed at right Target: YES X NOResults claimed: GOOD FAIR X POOR BAD MISS

* 10 a/c bomb load 6 x 500 lb GP.

(Over)

SECRET

1. 6 to 8 miles.
2. Overcast of stratus at 2100 feet.
3. 1 box 19 ships.
4. Moderate from I.R.
5. Smoke loaded into tank.
6. None.
7. Fair.
8. None.

V. Description of route from I.R. to target:

Formation consisted of 19 ships. Target - 1111 and 1111 1/2. Time of take off was 0746. The over target 0909. At 2000 feet a total of 90 bombs were dropped in the target area with fair results. Visibility was 6 to 8 miles with an overcast of stratus at 2100 feet. No anti-aircraft fire or experience d. No enemy aircraft encountered. Please read at 1017.

